The Dual Meaning of Meaning :: Philosophy Philosophical Essays

A central problem in the philosophy of language has been to find a way to reconcile first person authority about meaning with externalist theories of meaning. In other words, if meanings aren't wholly in the head (the externalist thesis), then how do we explain the apparent authority we have about what our own utterances mean? In this paper, I will present one possible and, I believe, highly plausible solution which will allow us to maintain that we do have first person authority with regard to the meanings of our utterances while still accepting the lessons that Twin Earth has taught us (that meanings are, at least in part, determined by the external world). Moreover, it is, I believe, a virtue of any philosophical theory that it remain as close to common sense as analytical rigour will allow. Thus, it is advisable that one try to approach philosophical questions as the layman — still 'untainted' by philosophy — would approach them. This brand of 'common sense phi losophy' is what I shall attempt to use in providing an account of meaning. Let us begin, then, by examining first person authority. It seems quite obvious to me that, should there be no successful reconciliation of first person authority with externalism, the former would defeat the latter in any theory of meaning. I do not say this just because it is highly counter-intuitive to think that we don't generally know what we mean when we speak, rather it seems to me to be impossible to deny that we have this knowledge: not only do we know what we mean, but we know that we know what we mean. Though most philosophers recognise the obviousness of this fact, some11 maintain that it is in need of an explanation. This, I believe, is because they take externalism as more 'primitive' than first person authority. What I mean is that these philosophers approach first person authority from the viewpoint of an already developed externalist theory. I suggest that, instead, we take the undeniability of first person authority as given and then attempt to provide a theory of meaning that preserves first person authority while accounting for the role of the external world in determining meaning. What exactly is it, then, of which we have this direct authoritative knowledge? And how, if at all, does it relate to the external world?